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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD SHIELDS,
.Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 7822

PETER RAMON,
Respondent.

BRIEF· OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF· F:ACTS
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's statement of
facts and for that reason· now sets forth the facts which
he contends are supported by the record.
The accident here involved occurred in the nighttime,
during a very heavy fog. (R. 39). Visibility was very
restricted. In one place Appellant's witness, Dipo, testi-
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fied that visibility was no greater than 25 feet. (R. 30).
Later he said it would not be possible to see an approaching car at a distance greater than 20 feet under the conditions prevailing at the intersection. at the time of the
accident, (R. 32) and that safe driving speed at the time
was not in excess of 5 miles per hour. ( R. 32.)
It was under these adverse weather conditions that
Respondent was slowly proceeding northward on State
Street in the lane next to the double lines dividing opposing lanes of traffic. Stopping at about the intersection
of Truman A venue and State Street before making a
left turn to the West, Respondent observed headlights of
two cars approaching from the North. He permitted
them to go by and noticed they were traveling slowlyno more than 10 miles per hour (R. 39). Looking again
to the North he saw no other headlights (R. 39). He
then began making a left turn very slowly-from two to
five miles per hour. Appellant, just before. impact, was
traveling along State Street in the lane next to the
dividing double lines in a southerly direction. According to Appellant's witness, Dipo, Appellant stated to
the officer, some thirty to forty-five minutes after the
accident, that he, Appellant, was traveling thirty miles
per hour just before impact and twenty-five miles per
hour at impact (R. 35 and 36). Appellant also told the
officer he did not see Respondent's car until it was "right ·
in front of him" (R. 30 and 31). .Appellant, himself,
admitted that he was traveling twenty-five miles per
hour. ·
Respondent saw Appellant's lights approaching very
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3
suddenly (R. 45 and 46), just prior to impact. The front
part of Appellant's vehicle 1nade contact with the right
rear side of Respondent's car. (R. 27 and 28). From the
in1pact Respondent's car traveled 67 feet while Appellant's car traveled 12 feet; (R. 34) no skid marks were
left by either car.
ARGUMENT
Respondent has no argument with the law and the
cases cited by Appellant. They state the law in this jurisdiction covering cases to which they apply. Respondent
disagrees only with the attempt made by Appellant to
apply them to the case at bar. In none of the cases cited
by Appellant are there any fact situations similar to the
one here before the court. In all of these cases visibility
was unrestricted. In the case before the court in this
appeal the visibility of both drivers was extremely impaired.
It is settled law that a driver in encountering a fog
is not bound as a matter of law to stop and wait for the
fog to lift in order to escape a charge of negligence. 60
C.J.S. P. 699; Peasley v. White, 152 Atl. 530; 129 Me.

450.
The degree of care to be exercised by an automobile
driver in a fog varies with the conditions of the fog,
of the roadway and of traffic. In other words, a driver
must exercise a degree of care consistent with existing
conditions. 60 C.J.S. P. 697; Cole. v. Wilson, 127 Me. 316;
143 Atl. 178; Silva v. Waldie, 82 P. (2) 282; 42 N.M. 514.
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Appellant contends that under the facts of this case
the court below was required to find respondent guilty
of negligence as a matter of law. This, in spite of the fact
that the evidence in support of the judgment and decree
rendered, was that respondent was traveling very slowly
and cautiously; that he stopped in preparation for making a left hand turn; that he perceived head lights of
two other cars approaching him at a slow rate of speed;
that he permitted them to go by, and looking again to the
North saw no other head lights and thereupon began to
make a left turn very slowly, and as he was doing so
appellant's car coming on at a speed of 30 miles an hour
struck respondent's car in its approximate center and
knocked it some 67 feet down the road.
We believe it was clearly witliin the province of the
court to weigh these facts which were put in evidence
and which appear as a matter of record' and that the case
is not one which this court on appeal can say fastens negligence upon the Respondent as a matter of law.
We refer the court to 5 Am. Jur. Page 892, wherein
it is said:

"725. Impa.ired Visibility.- Generally where
the driver of an automobile has been injured, or
his car damaged, in a motor accident where his
view was obscured by dust, smoke, or atmospheric
conditions, it is a question for the jury whether
his conduct constituted contributory negligence,
unless the facts and circumstances surrounding
the accident, and the inferences that may be
drawn therefrom, are not in dispute. Factors to
be considered in connection with arriving at a de-
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5
tern1ination of the motorist's contributory negligence are the speed of his automobile extent of
visibility, control of car, and any oth~r matterR
explanatory of the proper degree of care and
caution demanded under the cirmustances."
See also:

Schuster r. J olz nson, 145 A 29, 108 Conn. 704; Moffitt
z-. O.L.D. Foru·a.rd.Zng Co., 73 N.E. (2d) 164; 331 Ill. App.
278; Caudle v. Zenor, 251 N.W. 69; 217 Iowa 77; Reserve
Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 191 N.E. 745; 128 Ohio St. 519;
Langill v. First Nat. Stores, 11 N.E. (2d) 593; 298 Mass.
559; Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 36 S.E. (2d) 11;
225 N.C. 625; Pope v. Clary, Tex Civ. App. 161 S.W. (2d)
828.
In the above case of Moffitt v. O.L.D. Forwarding
Co. the court had this to say:
"The question of contributory negligence is
preeminently for the consideration of the jury, as
such negligence cannot be defined in exact terms,
and unless it can be said that the action of the
injured person is clearly and palpably negligent
it is not -within the province of the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury."
Of interest on this point are the cases appearing in 37
A.L.R. 584, et seq, and 73 A.L.R. 1027 et seq. In the
,cases annotated in the foregoing citations the various
courts held that the question of contributory negligence
under the facts of the respective cases there appearing
was a matter for the trier of the fact to decide and would
not be disturbed on appeal.
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In the case of .Alitz v. Minnea.polis & St. L. R. Co.,
196 Iowa, 437, 193 N.W. 423, an automobile driver was
struck and injured by a train at a crossing in which visibility was obstructed by smoke and fog. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, defendant appealed and
argued that under the facts of the case plaintiff was
chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of
law. The court there said:
"The question thus presented is not to be
answered or determined from the simple fact of
the collision, divorced or separated from its attendant circumstances. If, for instance, the jury
should believe from the evidence, as it was ·authorized to find, that the smoke did obscure plaintiff's view of the track, and that such obscurity
was accentuated by cloudy, misty, or foggy
weather, and that the approaching train was being
operated through this screen at a high rate of
speed, without sounding the proper crossing signals, then a finding by the jury that plaintiff's
act in attempting the crossing was consistent with
reasonable care on his part could not be set aside
as having no support in the record. Such conclusion is not at all inconsistent with the precedents
cited by appellant, where the simple fact of the
presence of smoke or stea:m obscures the traveler's vision has been held insufficient to excuse a
rash attempt to make a crossing."
In the case of Queen vs. Washington W a.t.er Power
Co., 128 Wash. 553; 223 Pac. 1045, plaintiff's car was
damaged when struck by a street car at a crossing and
plaintiff's vision was reduced to 20 feet by a severe snow
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stor1n. lTnder such facts the court held that it was a
question for the jury \vhether the plaintiff had acted as
a prudent person under the cirmustances and he could
not be held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of la\v. See also Devoto v. United Auto Transp.
Co., 223 Par. 1050, 128 \Vash. 604.
It is submitted by Respondent that the question of
contributory negligence under the law and facts of this
case 'vas a question for the trier of the fact, which question was resolved in favor of the respondent and against
the appellant; that the judgment in this case is fully sustained by the record and may not be disturbed in this
R..-...~ lJ; - ,A /1t• II•, t G- .,,"Jt,
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Appellant makes no argument in support of his contention that he is entitled to judgment. We make brief
reference to this matter, however, in order to leave no
doubt as to our position with respect to it.
We believe that appellant was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law under the case of NikoZ.eropoulos v.
Ramsey, 214 P. 304; 61 Utah 465, which states the law in
this jurisdiction to be that it is negligence for a person
to drive an automobile on a public street at such a rate
of speed that it cannot be stopped within the distance at
which the operator is able to see objects on the street
in front of him. Officer Dipo, Appellant's own witness,
testified that visibility was restricted to between 20 to 25
feet and that safe driving speed was 5 mils per hour.
Appellant admitted he was traveling 25 miles per hour
just prior to impact and according to Dipo, Appellant
admitted to him on the scene that he was traveling 30
0
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miles per hour. Neither automobile left skid marks
because neither party was able to see the other until just
immediately before impact when it was too late.
A reading of the whole record will make it clear to
this Court, as it was clear to_ the Court below that this
accident happened as a result of Appellant traveling at
a grossly negligent rate of speed in a dense fog; that
although Respondent was traveling slowly and cautiously as the circumstances required, he was helpless
when Appellant suddenly appeared out of the fog coming
at a high rate of speed; and that Appellant was unable
to avoid the collision because unable to stop within the
range of his vision.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit that the judgment of the
District Court of Salt Lake County is fully sustained by
the record and should therefore be affirmed with costs
to Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
WILFORD W. KIRTON, JR.,
ALBERT R. BOWEN,
Attorneys for R·espondent.
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